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A B S T R A C T
Despite August Krogh's famous admonition that a ‘convenient’ organism exists for every biological problem, we
argue that appeals to ‘convenience’ are not sufficient to capture reasoning about organism choice. Instead, we
offer a detailed analysis based on empirical data and philosophical arguments for a working set of twenty criteria
that interact with each other in the highly contextualized judgements that biologists make about organism
choice. We propose to think of these decisions as a form of ‘differential analysis’ where researchers weigh
multiple criteria for organismal choice against each other, and often utilize multidimensional refinement pro-
cesses to finalize their choices. The specific details of any one case make it difficult to draw generalizations or to
abstract away from specific research situations. However, this analysis of criteria for organismal choice and how
these are related in practice allows us to reflect more generally on what makes a particular organism useful or
‘good.’
1. Introduction
In 2011, a group of biologists estimated that there are 8.7 million
species currently living on Earth, give or take 1.3 million (Mora,
Tittensor, Adl, Simpson, & Worm, 2011). But biologists do not study
them all. In fact, many scientific commentators have been concerned
that experimental biologists seem to focus their research on a very small
fraction of extant species (Beery & Kaufer, 2015; Bolker, 2012). The
decision to focus on a particular species (or handful of species) or even
on a specific strain or variant is a common feature of biological research
(Burian, 1993; Clarke and Fujimura, 1992; Hopwood, 2011). In this
paper, we investigate the factors that guide the choice of organisms for
biological research, focusing particularly on the interrelation of such
criteria (see Table 1).
The most famous criterion for organism choice is usually attributed
to the Nobel Prize winning physiologist, August Krogh (Green, Dietrich,
Leonelli, & Ankeny, 2018). Dubbed Krogh's Principle by Hans Krebs in
1929, Krogh claimed that “[f]or such a large number of problems there
will be some animal of choice, or a few such animals, on which it can be
most conveniently studied” (Krebs, 1975; Krebs & Krebs, 1980; Krogh,
1929). The claim is popular amongst biologists, as can be seen through
the over 160 citations to Krebs' paper on the Krogh Principle over the
last forty years. Thanks to the Krogh Principle, the term ‘convenience’
has frequently been invoked when describing how researchers make
such decisions, but this single term is overly broad (Green et al., 2018).
‘Convenience’ has frequently been understood as signposting prac-
tical and logistical choices in research design, which are made irre-
spectively of conceptual analysis and are meant to facilitate the day-to-
day running of an investigation. In other words, the appeal to con-
venience has been interpreted by some researchers (and many philo-
sophers) to involve the removal of as many practical obstacles as pos-
sible from research activities, so that researchers can pursue their
studies without disruption or delays due to recalcitrant materials or
unwieldy laboratory conditions (Gest, 1995; Robert, 2008). Interpreted
in this way, ‘convenience’ has limited epistemic significance, and re-
mains tied to technical aspects of the set-up and planning of research
that some would contend are not central to science.
Appeals to convenience, we argue, are not sufficient to capture
reasoning about organismal choice. As contemporary physiologists
have noted: “The Krogh Principle, as it is now known, is often taken to
be about more than ‘convenience’ when selecting the ‘best’ organism for
the study of a certain physiological problem” (Andrews & Enstipp,
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2016, p. 42). Here, the use of ‘best’ reflects more than simple logistical
choices on the part of researchers. Reference to the terminology of
convenience can also be interpreted as signposting significant strategic
judgements around the design, realization, and interpretation of re-
search on non-human organisms which have considerable implications
for the type of knowledge obtained and the direction and organization
of biological research as a whole. Our analysis of more specific criteria
demonstrates that multiple criteria are at play within any one research
project. Some of these criteria interact synergistically with each other,
while others may be in tension or even direct conflict with one another.
The extent to which researchers manage these types of tensions and
strategize around the strengths and weaknesses of specific criteria
contributes to the success of their employment of particular organisms
in their research.
Our methods combine detailed analysis of scientific and historical
literature on the Krogh principle enriched with insights from our own
fieldwork and related historical and philosophical scholarship. We
begin with an examination of more general scholarship in philosophy
and biology on choice of research foci and components (section 2),
drawing on the oft-time cited philosophical account by the population
geneticist Richard Levins about “trade-offs” in model choice (1966) as a
starting point for a broader reflection on the strategies and implications
involved in the choices made when setting up a scientific project. We
explore whether choices of research organisms are characterized by
trade-offs similar to those Levins described in relation to model choice,
such as generality, realism, and tractability. We contend that Levins'
approach is insufficient for understanding the types of criteria asso-
ciated with organismal choice, and that stark or generic trade-offs of the
kind envisioned by him do not seem to exist in this domain.
Following a brief discussion on methodology (section 3), we identify
and discuss twenty criteria for organism choice (section 4). This ana-
lysis shows how the kinds of values, assumptions, and expectations that
enter into judgements about ‘good’ organismal choice are considerably
more complex than a seemingly simple appeal to convenience as a
pragmatic criterion. In section 5, we discuss how these different criteria
can be synergistic or antagonistic with each other, and how commit-
ment to one criterion (or a cluster of criteria) is often correlated with
deemphasizing or devaluing others. We also contend that the ways in
which each criterion for organism choice relates to others depends
strongly on the specific research situation, making it impossible to
produce a compact, generalizable matrix of trade-offs similar to the one
envisioned by Levins. We propose to think of this as a form of ‘differ-
ential analysis’ where researchers weigh multiple criteria against each
other, and often utilize multidimensional refinement processes to fi-
nalize their choices. We provide several examples which illustrate the
diversity of situations in which choice criteria are evaluated and stra-
tegically prioritized. We conclude that although the specific details of
any one case make it difficult to draw generalizations or to abstract
away from specific research situations, this analysis of criteria asso-
ciated with organismal choice and how they relate to each other in
practice allows us to reflect more generally on what makes a particular
organism useful or ‘good.’ These criteria also may prove useful in other
scientific domains involving choices of research focus or material, and
are critical to the scientific practices that result.
2. Philosophical perspectives on choosing research components
Judgements regarding theory choice (and what is considered to be a
‘good’ theory) appear to be useful analogs to judgements regarding
organismal choice, so we begin this section with a selective review of
the literature on theory and model choice for insights about the rea-
soning practices associated with assessing, evaluating, weighing, and
comparing criteria for those choices. Numerous philosophers, histor-
ians, and social scientists have distilled different sets of defining values
and norms for theory choice using various case studies. For instance,
Thomas Kuhn (1977, p. 322) offers a list of five criteria for good the-
ories (namely accuracy, consistency, broad scope, simplicity, and
fruitfulness), and W. H. Newton-Smith (1981, pp. 226–30) provides a
list of eight “good-making features of theories” (namely observational
nesting, fertility, track record, inter-theory support, smoothness, in-
ternal consistency, compatibility with well-grounded metaphysical be-
liefs, and simplicity), while Lindley Darden (1991) expands the list
further still. These lists, of course, could be expanded to include prag-
matic criteria common in the organism-choice related literature to be
discussed in more detail below (e.g., Burian, 1993; Clarke and
Fujimura, 1992), such as cost and tractability, and social criteria, which
include opportunism or political support for particular forms of re-
search. Some of these criteria, such as simplicity, are considered epis-
temic by some philosophers (Laudan, 1986) and social by some so-
ciologists (e.g., Bloor, 1981), although others have attempted to break
down those distinctions (e.g., Longino, 1990; Solomon, 2001).
It is undoubtedly the case that evaluative judgments in scientific
practice are typically multidimensional, be they in relation to the
choice of research materials, or of theories or models. Scientific eva-
luation of a theory or a model can entail the mutual satisfaction of
multiple criteria and/or trade-offs between different criteria. In his fa-
mous treatise on models in ecology, Richard Levins (1966; 1968) argues
that one cannot have both generality and precision in any one model.
He highlights how emphasis on a specific epistemic advantage of a
chosen research entity (i.e., a particular model of population biology in
his case) is unavoidably tied to simplifying assumptions and thus the
devaluing of other features. Levins points to generality, realism, and
tractability as traits of models that are necessarily in tension with each
other, and which cannot be achieved in equal measure in any one
choice. As he and many others building on his work have shown
(Matthewson & Weisberg, 2009; Odenbaugh, 2002, 2006; Weisberg,
2006), increasing the generality of a chosen model by making it ap-
plicable to a larger set of cases necessarily decreases its descriptive
value (its realism) as a representation of one specific case.
Even though they often are not as explicit as Levins, biologists have
used a fairly consistent constellation of standards in their comparative
evaluation of most theories, and philosophers of biology have done
considerable work to enumerate those values and understand the ways
in which they are used in scientific judgments (e.g., Lloyd, 1988 on
confirmation; Darden, 1991 on assessment during cycles of scientific
change; more generally on values in scientific practice, see; Longino,
1990; Lacey, 2004; Douglas, 2009). While there is a rich literature on
the rise of certain organisms in biological research, philosophers, his-
torians, and sociologists have taken a somewhat piecemeal approach to
Table 1
Criteria for organismal choice.
Cluster Criteria
(A) Access (1) Ease of Supply
(2) Phenomenal Access
(3) Ethical Considerations
(B) Tractability (4) Standardization
(5) Viability and Durability
(6) Responsiveness
(7) Availability of Methods and Techniques
(8) Researcher Risks
(C) Resourcing (9) Previous Use
(10) Epistemic Resources
(11) Training Requirements
(12) Informational Resources
(D) Economies (13) Institutional Support
(14) Financial Considerations
(15) Community Support
(16) Affective and Cultural Attributes
(E) Promise (17) Commercial and Other Applications
(18) Comparative Potential
(19) Translational Potential
(20) Novelty
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articulating the criteria that have been crucial to organismal choice in
part because of their reliance on case studies of key organisms. In his
reflections on the choice of experimental organisms, Richard Burian
(1993) directs our attention to a number of features of this situation.
Examples include how contingencies of evolution and circumstance
make it difficult in many cases to know immediately whether a parti-
cular organism is a good choice for a particular investigation, and how
the attributes of an organism can transform the researchers' perspec-
tives on the investigative task at hand and lead them to questions that
are better suited to the organism's features. Burian rightly emphasizes
the multiple contingencies involved in finding and making an organism
suitable for an investigative task. He notes that “the features that an
organism should possess in order to be suitable for a given job are
determined in good part by the problem at issue and by the available
techniques” (p. 361, n. 20).
While Burian acknowledges the importance of issues including
standardization and cost, he points to work by Doris Zallen (1993) for
more detailed criteria. Zallen's careful analysis of the history of pho-
tosynthesis research leads her to articulate criteria such as the match
between organismal properties and experimental equipment, the “ease
of cultivation and maintenance of the organism,” the stability of the
organism's properties, the ease with which multiple methods can be
applied to the same kind of organisms, and the ease with which results
can be generalized to other organisms (pp. 278–279). In the same
special issue of the Journal of the History of Biology, Fred Holmes (1993)
celebrates the “simplicity, ready availability, and capacity to survive
severe injury” (p. 326) that made the frog the organism of choice for
nineteenth-century physiology, while Bonnie Clause (1993) documents
the power of standardization embodied in the Wistar rat. Developed
from rich historical case studies, these early accounts of organismal
choice stopped short of synthesis or generalization with regard to cri-
teria. They did, however, recognize the complex interplay between
different choice criteria, as well as illustrating diverse approaches to
biological practice, including problem- or question-based research as
compared to more descriptive strategies where a problem might emerge
down the line.
At first glance, organismal choice using multiple criteria appear to
inevitably involve trade-offs of a similar nature to those envisioned by
Levins with regard to model choice. For instance, if one is interested in
investigating fundamental biological processes shared by a broader
class or taxon of organisms, an obvious candidate will be one of what
have come to be recognized as the canonical “model organisms” (NIH,
2010). Relying on one of these organisms is likely to increase the
generality of results, and particularly their applicability to higher level
or more complex organisms including translation to humans, and at the
same time can decrease the value of the organism in descriptive terms
(what Levins calls ‘realism’) as a representation of one specific case
(Ankeny & Leonelli, 2011). This sort of superficial adherence to Levins'
trade-offs belies, we argue, a more complex set of judgements that in-
volve what we call ‘multidimensional refinement processes,’ that is, the
identification and comparison of various implications of the potential
choices under consideration, embracing a range of factors including
those that are more material (such as access and tractability), socio-
political concerns (such as various economies), available resourcing
(including epistemic resources such as previous theories), and future
potential. This process of multidimensional refinement in turn involves
a wide range of criteria utilized for choosing organisms, and a high
degree of variability in terms of how such criteria are combined in any
one instance of research organism choice. To illustrate this, we develop
a analysis of the criteria involved in organism choice in section 4.
3. Identifying criteria for organismal choice: methodology
A brief description of the methods used to provide the empirical
grounding for our analysis is necessary before we delve into it, parti-
cularly since some of the criteria that we identify as relevant to
organism choice have not yet been discussed at length within the his-
torical, philosophical, or sociological scholarship on the life sciences.
Some interpretations of what counts as “convenience” (or more gen-
erally as criteria for “good” organismal choice) are explicitly discussed
in published research by biologists, while others often can only be as-
certained via observations of their scientific practices or presentations
of their work in venues such as lab meetings or conferences, or via
interviews or conversations with researchers about their practices (for a
complementary account to ours on ‘good enough’ choices of animal
models from a sociological perspective, see Lewis, Atkinson,
Harrington, & Featherstone, 2013). Our starting point for this analysis
was the collation and analysis of published biological literature that
makes explicit reference to Krogh's principle and/or focuses on the issue
of organismal choice, including both review papers and original re-
search articles, starting from a list of over 160 articles obtained from a
citation search in Web of Science. Cataloguing and assessing the various
interpretations of Krogh's principle within that literature provided us
with an initial outline of commonly utilized criteria. We were aware
that many of these accounts of scientific methodology were retro-
spective reconstructions or pieces of methodological advice that may
not reflect actual scientific practice or the range of circumstances in
which these choices may in fact be made, but our aim was to explore
the range of criteria biologists appeal to when clarifying or justifying
their choice of organism(s). We enriched this initial taxonomy with
other sources, including our own extensive fieldwork observing scien-
tific practices or interviewing scientists1; informal, non-peer-reviewed
source materials (e.g., grey literature shared within communities on
experimental protocols); and the extensive previous historical and so-
ciological scholarship on organism choice. We do not claim that our
search was exhaustive or that it is perfectly descriptive of biological
practice. We started from biologists' categories and refined them in light
of our knowledge and experience as a diverse group of historians and
philosophers of science to create a set of twenty criteria.
Our method explicitly aims to provide a philosophically useful ac-
count of criteria for organism choice that is both compatible with sci-
ence in practice and allows us to develop deeper understanding of how
conditions associated with research affect organismal choice, and in
turn the outcomes of that research. The list of criteria that we have
identified is not systematic in the sense of being grounded in a study of
all existing scientific literature on the subject (as would be the case in a
standard scientific systematic literature review), a task that in this case
would be thankless given the amount of scholarship involved and the
absence of any discussion of organismal choice in most biological
publications. Instead, it provides a more expansive and empirically
grounded list of criteria than has been proposed to date, that may
usefully serve as a starting point for additional empirical investigations
by scholars interested in organismal choice.
4. Twenty criteria for organismal choice
Our analysis has yielded twenty criteria for organismal choice. It
may well be that additional criteria will be found through a different
type of analysis of biological literature and practice, or via detailed
focus on certain fields (such as those that are not experimental which
tend to be less well-represented in the biological literature on orga-
nismal choice), and we thus see this paper as a step towards the further
study of these issues. The criteria have been clustered together in order
to allow the broader categories to serve as more accessible prompts for
those who wish to utilize these criteria; these clusters are undoubtedly
only one way amongst many to group the criteria and are not intended
1When considered together, these fieldwork experiences encompassed eth-
nographic and interview-based research as well as collaborations within
biology laboratories across Europe, the US, and Australia, carried out as part of
several different projects over the last twenty years.
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to be viewed as definitive or even necessary, but merely provided as a
pragmatic device for the reader's convenience. The clusters clearly are
not rigid, as many of the criteria have features that overlap with those
in other categories; however, we believe that providing the criteria
clustered in this manner allows a logical flow that helps to reveal im-
portant overlaps and discontinuities.
4.1. Access
The criteria in this section speak to issues of accessing organisms
that are thought to be potentially useful for research or to provide ac-
cess to the phenomena of interest. We include ethical considerations as
a criterion which may regulate access to organisms or to some types of
uses of particular organisms.
4.1.1. Ease of supply
Whether organisms are readily available (such as via strain centers)
or rare and difficult to obtain can have a significant impact on orga-
nismal choice. Scarcity of organisms at a location or particular time of
year can be limiting factors in research. For example in the early
twentieth century, biologists studying the process of fertilization using
amphibians had to wait for seasonal breeding periods when fertilized
eggs were readily available. Later when it became possible to hor-
monally induce fertilization in the laboratory, temporal availability
became less of a constraint (Rugh, 1968).
Whether one is searching for specimens in nature or ordering them
through a supplier can make a significant difference for organism
availability. Organisms can be obtained from commercial suppliers, as
in mouse research (Rader, 2004), exchange networks and strain centers
among laboratory groups as in the Arabidopsis and C. elegans research
communities (Leonelli, 2007; Wood and the Community of C. elegans
Researchers, 1988), or natural or wild settings (e.g., Abzhanov et al.,
2008). The creation of marine stations in the early twentieth century,
for instance, greatly facilitated research on a wide of range of organisms
that were only available near the sea (Maienschein, Matlin, & Ankeny,
2019). Limited availability of organisms from wild or natural sources
can make research on them highly localized and non-transferable. If it is
important to study the organisms within their natural environment,
research can be further restrained geographically and temporally.
4.1.2. Phenomenal access
Undoubtedly what researchers want to study (problem choice)
constrains many of the choices that they make regarding research or-
ganisms, though not all biological investigations begin from a specific
problem or question. There are many cases where researchers design
their work around a specific research question concerning a particular
phenomenon of interest, and thus look for an organism that provides
access to that phenomenon in the sense of instantiating its typical
features or providing insights that can be used towards understanding
the phenomenon in question. For instance, Michel Milinkovitch and
Athanasia Tzika (2007) point out that fruit flies have an “easy-to-score
morphological variation” (p. 338) that made Drosophila a particularly
useful organism for genetics. At the same time, it is significant that the
easy-to-group morphological variations became a selling point after
Thomas Hunt Morgan's fly lab identified them (Kohler, 1994) does not
help explain why fruit flies were chosen in the first place. In another
example, in the 1930s and the 1940s, Jean and Katsuma Dan used a
variety of marine organisms to study cell cleavage. The Dans focused on
these organisms because they provided insights into the cell division
process, as the chosen organisms varied in the rate of division and
provided uncommon visibility of phenomena involved in cell cleavage,
such as astral rays (Dietrich, Crowe, & Ankeny, 2019).
Organism choice may become very restricted depending on the
phenomena that one is trying to access. In embryology, some eggs have
opaque shells that make observing the process of cell cleavage very
difficult: hence if cell cleavage is the phenomena that a researcher
wishes to investigate, organisms with more translucent embryos are a
better choice. Specific questions regarding mammalian physiology may
make choices between some organisms easy for researchers; mice pro-
vide phenomenal access to cancer genetics in a way that Saccharomyces
may not, for instance. That being said, research models do not have to
be isomorphic to the phenomenon of interest as long as effective
comparisons be made (see criteria 18, comparative potential). Scientists
working with zebrafish have pointed out, for example, that “the zeb-
rafish intestine is analogous to the human intestine with segmentation
of the small and large intestine” (Schwartz, de Jonge, & Forrest, 2015,
p. 370), making them a reasonable organism choice if one is interested
in issues related to the human digestive system. Notably since re-
searchers can validate the use of an organism due to its analogous
phenomenal access, a great many organismal choices can include many
of the other criteria we list here.
4.1.3. Ethical considerations
Ethical considerations are clearly criteria that enter into organism
choice and use, as different organisms have different moral standing
and are subject to varying levels of ethical and legal regulation de-
pending on the type of research and the locale in which it is to occur,
among other factors. The most obvious example is use of non-human
primates which many contend would be the most appropriate experi-
mental organisms for behavioral and other types of research where the
intention is to apply findings directly to humans, but where ethical (and
financial) restrictions often enter into decisions.
Even more generally, humans might well be the most appropriate
organisms on which to study human processes, but in many types of
research, using human subjects is thought to be ethically unjustifiable,
and hence mice and rats are extremely popular experimental organisms
for biomedical research. Other species are problematic because of their
availability due to being vulnerable or endangered; public perceptions
regarding use of these animals for research, and particularly their de-
gree of sentience and susceptibility to psychological and physical harm;
or restricted access due to import or quarantine regulations (see e.g. the
cases of monkeys and pigs analyzed in Koch & Svendsen, 2015;
Svendsen, 2017). Concerted efforts by funders, regulators, and research
institutions to use the three Rs (replacement, reduction, and refine-
ment) as the key framework in animal experimentation in order to
ensure what occurs is humane has led to support of alternative types of
organisms, including increasing numbers of non-mammalian models
including microorganisms and invertebrates, and even in vitro (e.g., cell
and tissue cultures) or non-biological systems (e.g., computer simula-
tions) where possible (Davies, Greenhough, Hobson-West, & Kirk,
2018).
4.2. Tractability
The criteria clustered under the heading of tractability each address
dimensions of scientific practice. Some of these criteria focus on the
ability of organisms to adapt to research conditions, such as whether
the organism survive in captivity or respond to experimental treatment.
Other criteria are more researcher-focused, such as what kinds of risks
an organism poses for the researcher or what kinds of techniques can
the researcher readily apply to the organism in question.
4.2.1. Standardization
In some cases, researchers require organisms whose features are
stable enough to be reliably documented and compared across different
laboratories by independent researchers (Hopwood, 2005, 2007; Logan,
2002; Robert, 2008). Complex techniques and methods have emerged
to ensure that research organisms acquire and/or preserve certain
characteristics across generations, giving rise to collections of stan-
dardized organisms as well as mutants and variants. The move towards
standardizing organisms, most glaring in the case of model organisms,
is typically accompanied by increasingly sophisticated standards for
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describing their characteristics, as exemplified by the recent revival of
phenomics (Houle, Govindaraju, & Omholt, 2010) and morphology as
fields of active research interest. As a result, some organisms come to
“corner the market,” in the sense that “so much begins to be known
about a particular animal model—that is, they become so popular—that
even more compelling potential models are no longer explored”
(Burggren, 1999, p. 149).
There are other cases, by contrast, where what researchers value is
the absence of standards. The degree of natural variation within a
species has a significant role to play in its employment within research.
These are situations where biodiversity and variability are themselves
under scrutiny, requiring researchers to look for highly variable or-
ganisms that can help investigate either natural or induced variability
within a laboratory environment. Fast-evolving microbial communities
are a typical example here as are plant variants (e.g. Love & Travisano,
2013).
4.2.2. Viability and durability
Another possible interpretation of ‘convenience’ when it comes to
research organism choices is connected to the logistics of conducting
research. Here considerations of viability and durability as they affect
generation cycles and physical robustness become important. As Jessica
Bolker (2009) succinctly points out, “small size, rapid and robust de-
velopment, and short generation time are also advantageous for many
types of research” (p. 487). Many of the advantages that researchers
have noted about Drosophila fall into this category. Fruit flies reproduce
quickly, allowing researchers who were interesting in studying the
transmission of traits from one generation to the next gather more in-
formation more quickly compared to organisms with seasonal genera-
tional cycles, such as maize. Similarly, high fecundity has typically been
viewed as an advantage, as it allows for more individuals per genera-
tion.
However, just because an organism is small, has short generation
periods, and highly fecund, it is not necessarily an easy choice for long-
term experimental research. These attributes only become useful if they
can be used in a laboratory setting. Organisms that are highly sensitive
to captivity (e.g., where they have poor health and/or die quickly) or
have problems procreating outside their natural habitat make it diffi-
cult for researchers to study them. For instance, John Gurdon and Nick
Hopwood (2000) report the advantages of Xenopus to be “ease of
maintenance…exceptional resistance to disease…a [short] life cycle…
large numbers and size of eggs…and above all its year-round re-
productive response” (p. 43). These qualities gave particular ad-
vantages over other amphibian species for studies of development. In
comparison, Rana pipiens, a popular choice for researchers in the United
States during the first half of the twentieth century, could not be bred in
captivity or kept longer than a few months without deterioration. Later
in the 1960s and 1970s, researchers using Rana had to contend with
problems obtaining healthy specimens as wild populations experienced
significant increases in rates of cancers. In comparison, the robustness
of Xenopus became increasingly useful for researchers.
4.2.3. Responsiveness
When Krogh (1929) originally highlighted that a large number of
problems can be most conveniently accessed through specific animals
of choice, he was referring to features of selected animals that make a
biological process or mechanism more experimentally accessible.
Among all possible choices, he argued, there will typically be a few
organisms that provide better opportunities for the experimental ma-
nipulation of features of interest, or for non-experimental forms of in-
teracting with the organism to elicit information about phenomena of
interest. As an example, Krogh highlighted that the lungs of tortoises
are well suited for studies of the respiratory system. Because the trachea
for each lung are highly divided compared to mammals, these organ-
isms make it possible to independently measure gas exchange in the two
lungs. Experiments on tortoises and frogs were central to Krogh's
demonstration of how gas exchange occur by diffusion alone, an insight
that was later generalized also to mammals (Wang, 2011). Other his-
torical examples occur in the case of the giant axon of the Loligo squid
that provided empirical data for the Hodgkin-Huxley model, and the
highly metabolic activity of pigeon breast muscle which allowed Hans
Krebs to experimentally study the processes of oxidative metabolism
(Krebs, 1975).
Features that ease experimental access can be purely practical or
instrumental, such as a convenient size of a particular organ or or-
ganism: Krebs (1975) notes several examples in which “one of the de-
cisive advantages is the mere size of the material, so that manipulations
can become easier” (p. 225) including giant water bugs, the giant
unicellular alga Acetabularia, and Bufo marinus (the giant Neotropical
toad). But experimental access often is associated with specialized
adaptive features that are more clearly displayed in specific organisms.
In such cases, it is often stressed that distinct or extreme adaptations
can give insight to “the limits to which organismal design can be driven
and often best and most clearly illustrate the basic design principles at
work” (Adriaens & Herrel, 2009, p. 1). For instance, the freshwater fish
Inanga exhibits an extreme capacity to maintain sodium homeostasis
across wide changes in water salinity and has been highlighted as an
organism particularly well suited to study basic principles of ion
transport and sodium regulation (Lee, Collings, & Glover, 2016). Or-
ganisms with extreme morphologies or capacities are thus often chosen
as the experimental starting point for exploring more general relations
between structure, function and environmental demands (see also cri-
terion 18, comparative potential). Conversely, organisms that are well-
recognized as canonical model organisms fail the test of experimental
accessibility with regard to certain types of experimentation; for in-
stance as noted by physiologist Kevin Strange, “It is safe to say that C.
elegans violates Krogh's Principle when it comes to electrophysiology.
Most somatic cells in C. elegans are quite small, and a tough, pressurized
cuticle surrounding the animal limits access for study by patch clamp
methods” (2002, p. 12). More generally, what experimental accessi-
bility is taken to involve varies depending on the inquiry at hand, as
demonstrated by the shifting status of organisms with large chromo-
somes (such as wheat or maize) depending on whether research focuses
on sequencing or transposon activity.
4.2.4. Availability of methods and techniques
Having a well-developed set of tools for a particular organismal
system can be a factor in the decision to adopt that system for labora-
tory or field research. For instance, as Drosophila was developed as an
organism for genetic research in the first decades of the twentieth
century, tools, techniques, and materials were developed that made the
use of Drosophila easier and more consistent across researchers (Kohler,
1994). Simple matters, such as the size of bottles used to grow flies, the
recipe for fly food, and the type of material used to make the bottle
stopper, were routinized. Later as the Drosophila community grew, this
technical information was communicated through the Drosophila In-
formation Service, which shared technical information such as how to
build a constant temperature growth chamber. The availability of this
body of knowledge meant that new researchers had to invest less of
their time and energy into the development of crucial organismal in-
frastructure, including development and maintenance of specialized
mutant stocks. Similar configurations of techniques, skills and infra-
structures characterize research on other key model organisms, such as
Arabidopsis and C. elegans (Ankeny & Leonelli, 2011, 2012). At the same
time, such a complex and sophisticated body of methodology, tech-
nologies, and analytic techniques is not always or even typically re-
quired when choosing organisms with which to work. Often researchers
can make do with locally grown knowledge about how to handle an
organism, as well as techniques and technologies enabling a smooth
experimental interaction with it.
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4.2.5. Researcher risks
Some research involves risk of danger and harm to researchers,
organisms, and/or ecosystems. These risks of harm can hinder research
on certain organismal systems. For instance, research on pathogens is
crucial, but dangerous. The system of containment protocols and
standards for disease organisms speaks to the risk to human researchers
that can accompany some types of organismal research (Hunt, 2006).
Research on venomous snakes likewise entails obvious risks that have
to be taken into account when deciding to use them as research or-
ganisms (Altimari, 2000). The risk of harm to the organisms themselves
should constitute an ethical concern, which we consider under our
criterion A3, ethical considerations, in section 4.1.3.
4.3. Resourcing
The criteria in this section point to different kinds of intellectual
resources that can facilitate research on a particular organism.
4.3.1. Previous use
The knowledge already available to researchers about a given or-
ganism—including about its physiology, genetics, and behavior—often
plays a crucial role in shaping organism choice, in what in some cases
might be described as allegiance to a given species. The acquisition of
knowledge about an organism requires significant effort, much of which
is not directly related to the investigation of the research questions at
hand (e.g., learning how to feed the organism or how it reacts to spe-
cific laboratory conditions). This expertise helps to explain why re-
searchers who have been trained in using a particular organism have
tendencies to continue using it (Flannery, 1997, p. 244). Increasing
familiarity with an organism thus increases the entrenchment of that
organism within a given research community, as do the use of specific
techniques, technologies, and conceptualizations.
A deep body of knowledge concerning a particular organism also
increases the number of types of uses for which it can be deployed, as
demonstrated by the many cases where advantageous features of an
organism with respect to a specific research question only emerged in
retrospect once it was already adopted as a preferred model (Ankeny &
Leonelli, 2011). Hence applications of organisms that have been used
for research purposes for several decades, such as the dinoflagellate
Oxyrrhis marina, “appear to be rising exponentially across a number of
fields” (Montagnes et al., 2011, p. 550).
4.3.2. Epistemic resources
Organism choice occurs against the backdrop of existing intellectual
traditions, theoretical perspectives, and/or disciplines, and thus tends
to conform—at least in some or most respects—to the background as-
sumptions and conceptual commitments championed by the scientists
involved in the research (this criterion hence echoes Kuhnian con-
siderations, see e.g. Kuhn, 1977). The extent to which an organism fits
such expectations, and thus the broader epistemic landscape within
which the research is situated, is significant to the choice of organisms
particularly since any rupture from such landscape needs to be justified
and accounted for. A simple example can be found in the limited efforts
to date to use plants to study certain kinds of phenomena: traditionally
plants have been viewed as extremely simple and relatively inactive
organisms that are largely stimulus-driven and have limited (if any)
behaviors worthy of study. Thus, they have typically been thought to be
poor choices for studying behavior, let alone cognitive activities.
However, some researchers are choosing to use plants in novel ways by
pushing back against these received views, for instance to study asso-
ciative learning, and using positive findings to encourage others to re-
think their assumptions about using plants for these types of research
(Gagliano, 2017; Ruggles, forthcoming). Thus, while the criterion of
epistemic resources recognizes the important role of theory in biolo-
gical research practices, it also highlights the varied roles that back-
ground theories can play in organism choice. As one criterion among
many, its significance may shift significantly depending on the situa-
tion, and be less decisive than sometimes predicated within the philo-
sophical literature on modelling (e.g. Currie & Levy, 2015).
4.3.3. Training requirements
The amount of time needed to develop expertise and research
competence can also be a factor in the choice of an organism. Well-
developed systems may require review of a daunting amount of mate-
rial associated with developing skills. Specialized manuals on organ-
isms such as C. elegans, Arabidopsis, and Drosophila (see Sullivan,
Ashburner, & Hawley, 2000) offer detailed descriptions of these sys-
tems. A new or relatively immature organismal system where very little
is known and much needs to be developed before the system can be
reliably manipulated requires much more extensive experience and
training. Reflecting on her choice of a non-model organism, biologist
Stefania Castagnetti reports, “For the new species, we have to start from
scratch, figuring out simple things like their reproductive season, how
to obtain mature eggs, how to treat the embryos. Even to film untreated
embryos we have to figure out how to mount them. So for each animal,
we have to start all over again” (Perillo, 2017).
4.3.4. Informational resources
The adoption of an organism for research can be strongly influenced
by the presence of databases, newsletters (Kelty, 2012), and/or journals
dedicated to the study of a given species. Researchers often ask them-
selves whether there are resources that make information available
about their organism of choice, or at least groups of people that they
can approach to acquire more knowledge about it. The importance of
informational resources has been increasingly recognized by funding
bodies around the world, which are often confronted with difficult
choices around which of such resources to fund (and thus, which or-
ganism to support as a better for particular types of research). For ex-
ample, “The National Institutes of Health (NIH) directly support data-
base development when there is significant demand. Consider the
phenomenal success of GenBank (www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov) or the sig-
nificance of FlyBase (flybase.bio.indiana.edu) to the Drosophila com-
munity. Both of these resources are a testament to the influence that a
well-supported database can have on promoting and shaping research”
(Halanych & Goertzen, 2009, p. 477). Repositories that are not focused
on particular species but do enable researchers to compare different
species in relation to a common set of questions, are also highly valued
and influential in the choice of organism. An example is the study of
human craniofacial anomalies via non-human animals, where “data
repositories such as FaceBase (https://www.facebase.org/) are crucial
for advancing the field. Broad screening of animal models (such as the
mouse) can efficiently link gene identification to cellular function” (Liu,
2016, p. 169).
4.4. Economies
The criteria in this section speak to the financial, institutional, so-
cial, and moral or affective economies in which organisms may be
positioned. We cluster criteria that range from the financial to the
emotional because in part these criteria represent ways to consider
different kinds of costs and benefits for different parties.
4.4.1. Institutional support
The institutional contexts for researchers also can play a role in their
choice of organism. Some institutions have invested heavily in facilities
for particular organisms, therefore incentivizing and sometimes even
requiring researchers to use those organisms. Historically both the
Jackson Laboratory in Bar Harbor and the Wistar Institute in
Philadelphia are good examples of the institutional commitments to
mice and rats, respectively, that would have significantly influenced
organismal choices for researchers (Clause, 1993; Rader, 2004). Even
on a smaller scale, researchers hired into new institutions could also be
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incentivized to use established breeding colonies, networks, or labora-
tory infrastructures for a particular organism rather than using re-
sources to create the infrastructure needed for a new organism. In an
institution that may not have many resources, a researcher may choose
an organism precisely because it does not require much institutional
investment, particularly in locales where regulatory and compliance
costs can be high, such as for the use of genetically modified organisms
which in many countries requires the adoption of expensive and lo-
gistically challenging containment and security measures.
The priorities of even larger institutional structures also can play a
role in organism choice. Large funding agencies may explicitly favor the
use of particular organisms or decide to focus on projects that achieve
particular goals. The former is best exemplified in the official U.S.
National Institutes of Health designations in 1999 of thirteen model
organisms. Whether NIH actually favored projects using these organ-
isms is up for debate, but many researchers had the impression that
their work was more likely to get funded if they used one of the listed
organisms (Peirson, Kropp, Damerow, & Laubichler, 2017). In the latter
case, organismal choices for researchers can also be canalized when
funding institutions set topical priorities, such as occurred in the
Human Genome Project. Similarly, the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services 2015 BRAIN Initiative devoted tens of millions of
dollars towards research to map the human brain and incentivized re-
searchers to ask specific questions about phenomena.
4.4.2. Financial considerations
Given the above-mentioned specificity of material conditions,
technologies, and conceptual tools required to do research with any one
species, it is no surprise that a significant criterion affecting the choice
of organisms relates to the associated financial costs. Research budgets
are rarely as large as researchers would wish them to be and include
considerable capital expenditure such as equipment and staffing for
laboratories. Whenever choosing an organism, researchers need to
consider whether some of these costs are heightened or diffused by
available standardized organisms and related tools. In some cases, the
presence of already developed culture facilities or chromosome libraries
can help researchers economize; in others, the costs associated with
standard mutants (e.g., the oncomouse), containment facilities for such
mutants, or relevant technologies (e.g., next-generation sequencers)
will outstrip the advantages of choosing a particular organism.
Research costs can also vary widely from organism to organism.
Mammalian systems, for instance, require a much more complex, ex-
pensive, and extensive physical infrastructure than the average fruit fly
or zebrafish lab. Following NIH guidelines for rate setting practices,
most major U.S. research universities publish schedules of animal
husbandry per diem rates which are revealing: for instance at the
University of Michigan, the per diem rate for a mouse is $0.44, while for
a pig is $17.42.2
Arguments around emerging model organisms provide particularly
useful examples for analyzing arguments about the financial require-
ments of selecting organisms that do not have established track records
of use in research: for instance, “increased resources from funding
agencies will have to stretch to support the development of new com-
munity resources (e.g., transgenics or culture facilities) and the creation
of preliminary tools (e.g., EST collections or bacterial artificial chro-
mosome libraries) for emerging model systems, making it even more
important that choices be made with care” (Abzhanov et al., 2008, p.
359).
4.4.3. Community support
Organism choice and use is strongly shaped by the availability of a
community which can provide various forms of support for the research
being pursued (Leonelli & Ankeny, 2012), particularly amongst those
earlier in their careers. In addition to informational resources, com-
munities provide a location for presenting research and recognized
methods for peer review and feedback, especially through those com-
munities which are primarily focused on a single organisms or group of
organisms and convene regularized conferences, as well as steering
communities, oversight groups, and so on which provide institutional
structures that support and justify the research. Community support
also results in stronger pooled resources becoming available for in-
formal and sometimes more formal exchange, such as strains, materials,
methods, data, findings, and techniques. The existence of a community
organized around a particular organism also tends to lead to greater
recognition more broadly in biology, including amongst funders
(Leonelli, 2019).
4.4.4. Affective and cultural attributes
When the American Elasmobranch Society asked its members for
reasons why they studied sharks, one responded “Because sharks are
cool!” (Ferry & Shiffman, 2014, Appendix 2). Self-professed ‘shark
huggers’ have more than an intellectual attachment to their organisms.
Like other ‘charismatic megafauna,’ sharks are linked to a powerful
symbolism (in this case around strength, speed, and danger) that has
become entrenched in many cultures around the world. It also colors
researchers' interactions with these creatures as well as the ways in
which such interactions are narrated both within and outside the re-
search community, for instance in the widespread discourse around
sharks being ‘less dangerous than people’ and the emphasis by con-
servation biologists on the falsity of some of the cultural stereotypes
associated with the animal. They also, and relatedly, elicit an emotional
connection from researchers. In the words of another elasmobranch
biologist, ‘‘I enjoy (get personal happiness) from interacting with elas-
mobranchs more than any other taxa.’’ It is not only people who work
with charismatic organisms that form attachments to their research
organisms. Research communities form strong loyalties to many dif-
ferent types of organisms ranging from microbes to weeds, which may
be grounded in familiarity with these organisms as well as the value
attributed to them within the broader ecosystem. The intense emotional
link between marine biologists and coral reefs, whose threatened ex-
tinction has come to symbolize the threat posed by human-made cli-
mate change on the planet, is a case in point (Braverman, 2016). These
connections can also be a source of tension as attachment to organisms
may lead researchers to treat them more as pets than research subjects,
raising not only questions of objectivity, but about the ethical status of
research organisms (Herzog, 2002; Lehman, 1992).
4.5. Promise
This final cluster of criteria is comprised of forward-looking criteria.
These criteria speak to the promise of potential of an organism to
produce a commercial reward, to be compared to studies in other or-
ganisms, to be used in a medical context, or to lead to novel findings.
4.5.1. Commercial and other applications
The potential to use research on organisms (or even the organisms
themselves) as products or as part of various technologies or applica-
tions in some cases shapes research choices. Examples abound, such as
exploring materials produced by various organisms as exemplars that
can be used via biomimicry and other techniques to produce novel
products like bee, ant, and wasp silk (for a review, see Liu & Jiang,
2011). Zebrafish may well be the ‘Rosetta stone’ of biology due to its
role in molecular biological research (Gest, 1995), but in fact it is highly
valuable in economic terms allowing tests of the effects of effluents
among other applications (Vascotto, Beckham, & Kelly, 1997). Simi-
larly, there are historical examples of organisms doubling up as com-
mercially viable technologies, such as the use of Xenopus in pregnancy
testing in the 1950s. As summarized by Kurt Schwenk, Padilla, Bakken,
2 Animal Husbandry Rates, University of Michigan. https://animalcare.
umich.edu/business-services/rates. Accessed on March 11, 2019.
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and Full (2009), “The vast diversity of functional solutions to en-
vironmental problems embodied within organismal systems and per-
fected through natural selection over evolutionary time provides a rich
resource for human needs. New sources of food, structural materials,
energy, microbial processes, waste and energy conversion, problem-
solving algorithms, and engineering design remain to be discovered,
characterized, and developed. Organismal biologists can take a leading
role in this process and in organizing and directing the data so that it is
maximally beneficial” (pp. 9–10). A glaring example of this tendency is
to be found in contemporary plant science, where attention to the study
of commercially relevant crops is increasing at the expense of research
on economically irrelevant plants like Arabidopsis or less profitable
crops like Bambara groundnut.
In addition, the potential for an organism to serve as a cornerstone
of public engagement which in turn leads to support financial and
otherwise can be critical to organismal choice. For instance in con-
servation biology, focus on ‘charismatic species’ goes well beyond its
affective dimension but has considerable impact on the ability to fi-
nance research and build related endeavors such as tourism: in the case
of elasmobranchs (skates, sharks, and rays), researchers surveyed re-
ported that it is ‘‘easier to engage the public and therefore educate them
about conservation issues” (Ferry & Shiffman, 2014, Appendix 2), and
similar considerations apply to work on coral reefs (Braverman, 2016).
4.5.2. Comparative potential
Insights into relations between structures, functions, and environ-
mental constraints can be obtained by comparing organisms that are
hypothesized to display variation across a particular dimension. The
comparative method has for instance been central to insights in renal
physiology, where the kidneys of very diverse species (mammals, birds,
reptiles, amphibians, and fishes) have been compared to identify
functions of common structures such as renal tubules and Bowman's
capsule. The strategy has often been to observe a particular physiolo-
gical structure in an ‘exaggerated form’ among a specific species, and to
explore the generality of the structure or principles in a variety of other
species (Dantzler, 1987). Through such comparisons, physiological
adaptations to specific environmental challenges often become visible.
Comparing the kidney morphology of desert rodents to aquatic fresh-
water mammals for instance reveals that these differ with respect to the
length of the kidney structure called the loop of Henle, which upre-
gulates urea concentration through osmotic gradients along the loop
(Campbell & Reece, 2005; Schmidt-Nielsen, 1983).
The aim of the comparative method is not only to map biological
diversity, but also to identify variations over characteristic types of
solutions that respond to more general “constraints on being alive”
(Wouters, 2007, p. 66). This heuristic is in line with August Krogh's
recommendations as he stressed that the ideal of generality in phy-
siology could only be reached by studying physiological features
“throughout the myriad of organisms” and “in all their essential mod-
ifications” (Krogh, 1929, p. 202; see also; Jørgensen, 2001). From a
comparative point of view, organism choice is thus guided by an in-
terest in understanding the solutions that make possible the survival of
organisms under different environmental conditions, but also in un-
derstanding why there is unity in diversity in terms of shared physio-
logical or biochemical principles (Somero, 2000).
4.5.3. Translational potential
Organisms are often chosen because of the potential of translating
insights from experimental studies to the biomedical domain. Most
commonly, organisms are chosen because of their physiological or ge-
netic resemblance to humans, the presence of similar mechanisms in
both species, or due to high rates of incidence of a given disease of
interest. These features are often highlighted when justifying why mice
and rats currently make up the majority of vertebrate models in animal
experiments (Beery & Kaufer, 2015). Similarly, animals that are highly
sensitive to heavy metals or endocrine disrupting chemicals, such as
zebrafish, have been widely used to study potential impacts of chemical
compounds on human health and environmental effects (Dai et al.,
2014); species of yeast are routinely used to model cell deregulation in
oncology (Leonelli, 2018; Pray, 2008).
In some contexts, however, organisms are chosen for biomedical
research because of the lack of sensitivity to environmental expose or
due to the absence of a specific disease. Such organisms are often
highlighted as negative models of human physiology, as they offer some
advantages that are complementary to organisms chosen because of
similarity (Alstrup & Wang, 2016). For instance, mice do not develop
Alzheimer's disease unless specific human genes are incorporated in
their genome; thus transgenic Alzheimer's mouse models are explored
in an attempt to provide a controlled replication of the disease pa-
thology and explore possible targets of reversal (Elder, Gama Sosa, & De
Gasperi, 2010; Oddo et al., 2003). Negative models are also chosen in
the hope that these allow for insights to possible defense mechanisms.
The naked mole rat is an example of an increasingly popular experi-
mental organisms in cancer research, because, despite its longer life-
span compared to other rodents, it rarely develops cancer. Studies of
biochemical processes within the cells of the naked mole rats have
suggested a set of potential “anti-cancer mechanisms” that potentially
can be exploited in biomedical treatment (Rankin & Frankel, 2016; Tian
et al., 2013). Translational potential of experimental organisms can
thus stem from similarities as well as differences to human physiology
(Perlman, 2016).
4.5.4. Novelty
Novelty is another potential criterion for organismal choice: in a
space tightly occupied by ever-growing groups of biologists, particu-
larly in association with heavily used, more well-established research
organisms, some researchers seek novel options as they are viewed as
providing opportunities for new findings or diverse types of compar-
isons to other species. Clearly there are trade-offs here, as although a
lightly used or otherwise overlooked species may offer greater oppor-
tunities for discovery, it is likely to lack well-developed techniques and
methods or a community of fellow users to appreciate or take up
findings, particularly compared to traditional model and research or-
ganisms. Some have termed this the “inverse Krogh principle,” namely
“choosing to study a species that has been most appropriate for sti-
mulating new questions rather than providing definitive answers”
(Kram & Dawson, 1998; after; Dawson & Taylor, 1973), in this case
with specific reference to the use of the red kangaroo to study loco-
motion as a way of opening up a new research space via focus on a
novel organism.
More poetically, others cite the medieval similes of the “world as a
book” or the “treasure house of nature” as pointing to biodiversity as
critical for insights and learning, for instance in a biologist recounting
his own experience as “the sole PhD student working on hybrid poplar
in a department where virtually everyone else was studying
Arabidopsis” (Robischon, 2014, p. 195). A more general recent trend
focuses on ‘emerging model organisms,’ ranging from leeches to wal-
labies, which are organisms that typically have been relatively under-
explored except within particular research groups or fields, but which
are being argued to be useful for particular types of studies (CSHL,
n.d.). Finally, some emphasize ‘non-consensus’ models (e.g., Rosario-
Ortiz et al., 2008), thus explicitly embedding an aspiration for these
organismal choices to become more established and agreed upon more
widely in the future as useful models.
5. Practical applications of criteria for organism choice: strategies
in designing biological research
Organism choice involves complex judgements based on con-
sideration of multiple criteria, a situation which may not always be
explicitly discussed by scientists, although it is sometimes mentioned by
researchers attempting to articulate their methodological strategies. For
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example, Anneliese Beery and Daniela Kaufer (2015) claim that “The
choice of the best animal models for advancing understanding of
normal and abnormal human functions is constrained by disciplinary
traditions, expedience, cost, ethical and political consideration, and
institutional resources” (p. 117). Having identified a diverse range of
criteria for choosing (or rejecting), and using (or abandoning) research
organisms, we now turn to a discussion of how these criteria are used in
relation with each other.
In any instance of organismal choice, not all of the criteria will be
used; of those used, not all will be given equal weight. In fact, many
research situations require scientists to prioritize a cluster of criteria
over others. Such decisions are not merely grounded in claims about
contingency, for instance, when a researcher disregards the poor via-
bility of his or her chosen organism because it was inexpensive to use. If
a scientist's goal is to increase our knowledge of some phenomenon,
then phenomenal access and ease of supply typically will have more
weight than other criteria. In some cases, these criteria cannot be ful-
filled, and research on specific phenomena or organisms is not possible.
For instance, before the invention of submersibles, research on preda-
tion among deep ocean fish was limited by the lack of access to those
organisms. Limits on material supply made this research impossible. In
an analogous fashion, research on predation in fish requires the avail-
ability of fish (a condition that can be easily met), but the fish must also
engage in predatory behavior, so not every species of fish will suffice as
an object of study.
That said, adherence to these criteria need not be absolute.
Biologists regularly engage in what we term ‘multidimensional refine-
ment’ as they adjust the criteria which they are considering; their re-
search goals, questions, and methods; and consider the wider context
and circumstances of their research. Faced with the impossibility of
studying predation in deep ocean fish, biologists could have modified
the goals of their research to focus on a related problem, such as pre-
dation in freshwater fish where material is readily available and the
phenomenon of predation can be discerned amongst the many different
species that are available. This kind of refinement, we assert, is com-
monplace, even if it is seldom explicitly discussed in the methods sec-
tion of published papers (which typically focus on the logical re-
construction of the argument proposed, rather than the chronological
development of the research that underpins it). Even ethical criteria,
which are seen by many as providing a hard constraint on some forms
of contemporary research, can be subject to refinement. Widely ac-
cepted practices of replacement, refinement, and reduction in research
involving animals explicitly encourage minimizing ethically significant
harms by replacing, for instance, vertebrate for invertebrate organisms
(Davies et al., 2018). At the same time, the ethical principles informing
this practice have changed considerably over time, and their practical
implementation can differ across research environments.
While Krogh appealed to a criterion of convenience for organismal
choice, our list suggests that appeals to ‘convenience’ typically cover
several distinct criteria, often with complex relationships to each other;
how criteria are used is contingent and variable. In the context of
making a choice from among a range of organisms, we propose that
criteria can play a range of roles: for instance, they can constrain
choice; they can confer an advantage or disadvantage to a particular
organism or set of organisms; multiple criteria can act in synergy with
each other to confer a greater combined advantage; and multiple cri-
teria can antagonistically combine to confer a greater disadvantage to
an organism or set of organisms.
Criteria which act as constraints on choice limit the available set of
possible organisms. Ethical (or financial) considerations, for instance,
may be invoked to prohibit research on certain kinds on primates. In
this context, the criterion of ethical (or financial) considerations acts as
a constraint on the choice.
Some criteria may confer an advantage or disadvantage to some
organisms in a particular situation. For a herpetologist, cobras and
garter snakes may both be attractive research subjects, but the risk to
the researcher of handling cobras and the safeguards that their home
institution may require could confer an advantage to the garter snake.
In these kind of cases, multiple criteria are employed in a choice be-
tween a range of organisms. Choice can be predicated on a single cri-
terion or applied singly to organisms. When multiple criteria are used,
they can have different weights and researchers can use different de-
cision procedures to maximize or minimize certain payoffs or costs.
Because our focus here is on the criteria for choice, we leave discussion
of different decision strategies for another paper.
Multiple criteria can also combine to produce a synergetic effect:
their combination can amplify the advantage conferred beyond the sum
of the individual criteria. Similarly, for some combinations of criteria in
some circumstances, the criteria could interact antagonistically, pro-
ducing greater disadvantages than the sum of the individual criteria.
Possible synergies include relationships between know how, familiarity,
and standardization; between community support and informational
resources; or between translational potential, financial considerations,
institutional support, and commercialization. For instance, financial
considerations, institutional support, and commercial potential could
interact synergistically to produce a greater incentive to use a particular
organism. This feedback would be created when a university stands to
share in the profits from the commercialization of some research and
offers more space or financial support for that line of research.
Conversely, criteria such as previous use and ethical considerations
could act antagonistically. For instance, the success of zebrafish is said
to be due in part to the limited ethical considerations associated with it,
as compared to other vertebrate species. 3
In the philosophical discussion of Levins's criteria for model choice,
trade-offs between criteria play a central role. The idea behind a trade-
off is that criteria that are in a trade-off cannot both be fully realized at
the same time. Possible trade-offs between criteria for organism choice
might include previous use and novelty: a very well-studied organism
may be judged to be unlikely to yield an original new result. Unlike the
trade-offs in model choice which are grounded in logical relations be-
tween the criteria, however, the potential trade-offs in organismal
choice are themselves contingent: there are not logical trade-offs that
are obligatory regardless of the research context.
We view trade-offs between criteria for organism choice as non-
generalizable, because they depend as much on practical and situated
considerations as they depend on conceptual considerations about how
results obtained through the organism can be interpreted. Researchers
seek to satisfy multiple criteria in any given decision. So ethical and
financial considerations are not ‘trump cards’ that are the final arbiters
about organism choice for scientific research. Rather, doing ethical
research within a budget meets multiple goals: it instantiates a si-
multaneous solution to intersecting problems through the consideration
and weighting of a range of factors and criteria, which are all heavily
context dependent. Thus, the importance of determining advantages
and synergies among criteria over trade-offs is particularly significant.
While it is important to determine which criteria are in tension with
each other in a given research situation, it is also productive to think
about how different criteria may mutually coexist and/or reinforce each
other.
Virtually all the criteria listed above require that researchers iden-
tify and evaluate potential implications of choosing a particular or-
ganism before finalizing that choice. On the one hand, this process can
resemble a form of risk assessment (Abt, Rodricks, Levy, Zeise, & Burke,
2010), particularly when considering possible ethical concerns or the
epistemic implications of choosing a particular organism (such as the
projectability of results to other species). On the other hand, it can be
thought of as akin to a feasibility study (Bowen et al., 2009), where
scientists are concerned with the possibility that research may be im-
peded by material that fails to allow phenomenal access or institutional
3We are grateful to Reuben Message for pointing out this example.
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constraints and are attempting to assess what type of organism may fit
the available set-up. As has been noted in relation to risk assessment
and feasibility studies, the interpretation and practical application of
criteria for organism choice can vary significantly across contexts of
inquiry, with different combinations of factors determining a shift in
how each criterion is understood and implemented, a situation that
explains the historical shifts in the use and status of certain organisms
even within the same research programs and groups (see e.g. Kohler,
1994; Rheinberger, 1995).
Each research situation tends to involve different types of tensions
and utilize diverse combinations of criteria differently. In what follows,
we sketch two case studies to illustrate the usefulness of tracking how
different criteria are used in synergy or against each other through the
development of research programs around specific organisms, thus
exemplifying the process of multidimensional refinement which our
approach makes visible and accessible to historical and philosophical
analysis. These cases are necessarily oversimplified, and we hope that
others will find these criteria useful for more detailed and complex
analyses.
5.1. Choosing embryos
Our first case exemplifies the way in which our approach facilitates
the study of an individual's reasoning around model choice develops
over time. Like many areas of biology, the field of developmental
biology has gone through several shifts in research organism popu-
larity. For example, in the middle of the twentieth century the frog
species Xenopus gained in popularity whereas the use of urodeles,
specifically salamanders and newts, declined. The latter had become
particularly important to the field after the famous experiments of Hans
Spemann's group in the 1920s. Spemann and his students were espe-
cially adept at performing microsurgical manipulations of salamander
and newt embryos, which led to a cascade of experimental work on
induction in embryogenesis. In the 1970s, however, the frog Xenopus
pushed out salamanders and newts as the preferred objects of study
(Gurdon & Hopwood, 2000).
Historically there are lots of reasons why this occurred. Lancelot
Hogben created an important experimental colony of Xenopus, a frog
species from South Africa, in the 1930s and it grew in popularity be-
cause it was commonly used for pregnancy testing in the early and mid-
twentieth century (Hopwood, 2011). However, availability of the new
organism does not justify why it became popular for developmental
biologists to use. The reflections of Pieter Nieuwkoop, an embryologist
whose career spanned from the 1940s through the 1980s, offers more
insight into this change.
In 1996, Pieter Nieuwkoop reflected on the advantages and dis-
advantages of salamanders as he tried to come to terms with the rise of
Xenopus in developmental biology. Overall, he understood that good
research organisms needed to fulfill several criteria. The “the adequate
experimental animal,” he said, included “good local availability, easy
adaptation to laboratory conditions, proper length of breeding season,
relatively easy manipulation of eggs and embryos, adequate speed of
embryonic development, not too long a generation time, proper histo-
logical differentiation of embryo and larva, etc.” (Nieuwkoop, 1996, p.
617). We see here five of the criteria (ease of supply, phenomenal ac-
cess, standardization, viability and durability, and responsiveness)
coming to the fore in ways that, far from competing, reinforce each
other. The criteria of previous use, epistemic resources, and training
requirements are also emphasized in Nieuwkoop's account. What's in-
teresting is that he realizes that the standards for fulling these criteria
changed over time. He acknowledged that Xenopus offered some initial
advantages, namely, it “can be reared very easily under laboratory
conditions, while breeding can be initiated experimentally by gonadal
hormone injection throughout the entire year.” However, “it is certainly
the last fact that led to its preference over all other anuran species,”
because there were real problems with using the organism for the types
of research that dominated the field from the 1930s–1950s. Namely, if
one was interested in experimental morphology, as Nieuwkoop
was—research that necessitated transplantation of embryonic tis-
sues—then salamanders and newts offered real advantages over Xe-
nopus. In this regard, Xenopus had “serious limitations” due to the size of
their eggs and the “double-layered nature of the totipotent animal
moiety of the Xenopus blastula/gastrula and neurula stages.”
(Nieuwkoop, 1996, p. 618). In other words, there was deep problems
with phenomenal access for researchers in the mold of Spemann and
many other experimental embryologists during the 1940s and 1950s.
The disadvantages of Xenopus became less so as the field became
more focused on the molecular aspects of development in the 1960s and
1970s. Once genetics and biochemistry became the focus of research,
having physical access to the morphological development of the em-
bryo became far less of a barrier. Instead, the year-round breeding and
ease of laboratory husbandry offered significant advantages over ur-
odeles, which possessed limited periods of fertilization, creating serious
temporal constraints on experimental work. The ease with which this
limitation could be overcome in Xenopus was a major source of appeal
for researchers who wanted to conduct year-round molecular studies.
For a researcher like Nieuwkoop who came of age doing trans-
plantation experiments, the small size of Xenopus eggs and the difficulty
of following processes of gastrulation and neurulation visually were
strikes against understanding its morphological processes of develop-
ment. But these features were not limitations for biochemical or genetic
research. Nieuwkoop's complaint about the rise of Xenopus is not that it
is inappropriate for the uses to which it is put, but that its acceptance
marks a shift in the kinds of problems undertaken in experimental
embryology. His perspective on the adoption of Xenopus highlights a
shift in what is considered to be an adequate conceptual fit, as well as a
strong synergy between responsiveness, ease of supply, and phenom-
enal access, which however arguably limited the comparative potential
of the research produced using the organism. In 2009, the Xenopus
Community issued a white paper report that noted the significant levels
of funding awarded to Xenopus research, yet noted that limitations in
informatics infrastructure, genome sequencing, training centers, and
stock centers placed Xenopus at a disadvantage compared to other
model organisms (Dietrich, Ankeny, & Chen, 2014; Xenopus
Community, 2009). These financial and institutional factors were per-
ceived to be important to supporting the continued choice of Xenopus as
a research organism.
5.2. Settling on a “satellite organism”: the choice of Thellungiella
As a second case, we consider the much less prominent example of
using salt cress Thellungiella halophila (also published under a newer
designation, Eutrema salsugineum) to research salt tolerance in plants
(Inan et al., 2004; Yang et al., 2013). The case exemplifies the useful-
ness of our account towards tracking how organism choice emerges
from complex and dynamic social interactions, rather than the rea-
soning of an individual researcher. This type of situation has typically
proved more difficult for philosophers and historians of science to
analyze, and yet is by far the most common within the life sciences,
where organism choice tends to be the concern of groups and even
whole fields (part of what Strasser, among others, calls a “moral
economy”; Strasser, 2019).
The choice of salt cress was certainly related to phenomenal access:
given its ability to survive in environments characterized by extreme
salinity and cold temperature, the plant enables researchers to study the
functioning of osmolytes and ion channels within responses to abiotic
stress, which are in turn crucial to understanding plant growth in dry or
drought-prone areas (Inan et al., 2004). Even more important, however,
was its comparative potential with the well-established model organism
Arabidopsis thaliana, which is phylogenetically related and physiologi-
cally similar to salt cress and yet displays less tolerance to salinity,
making it possible to exploit some of the knowledge already available
M.R. Dietrich, et al. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biol & Biomed Sci xxx (xxxx) xxxx
10
about Arabidopsis to study a characteristic (salt tolerance) that Arabi-
dopsis itself does not exhibit. Thellungiella was praised for its short life
cycle, which is “very similar to that of Arabidopsis, and it shares im-
portant morphological and phenological attributes with Arabidopsis
that are necessary for rapid efficient genetic analyses” (Inan et al.,
2004, p. 1720), as well as its responsiveness, which paralleled char-
acteristics to which plant researchers working with Arabidopsis were
already accustomed: “[m]ore than any other reported halophyte, salt
cress offers simplicity and efficiency for genetic analyses. It represents
an outstanding case of a trait-specific genetic system that also provides
the needed powerful molecular genetic tools developed for the Arabi-
dopsis system” (p. 1720). Indeed, plant researchers list Thelungiella as
an ‘Arabidopsis satellite system,’ that is, a plant that is “phylogeneti-
cally as close to Arabidopsis as possible and therefore amenable to la-
boratory use and to the methods developed for Arabidopsis but with
special features not found in A. thaliana” (Chang, Bowman, &
Meyerowitz, 2017, p. 332). Here we see a convergence between the
criteria of comparative potential and training requirements, previous
use, and informational resources: researchers working on salt cress can
avail themselves of a rich trove of knowledge and resources associated
with Arabidopsis, which are likely (though this is open to empirical
scrutiny) to apply to Thelungiella as well. Last but not least, Thelungiella
was viewed as valuable towards producing more drought tolerance
plant varieties, which gives it an edge over Arabidopsis in terms of
commercial and translational potential.
These characteristics engender a high level of synergy among sev-
eral criteria for organism choice, and are manifested through an as-
sessment of the value of salt cress in relation to its role in the broader
landscape of plant science and its applications. This was in tension with
at least some interpretations of the criteria of novelty and institutional
support. At the time at which it was chosen, Thellungiella did not have a
reference genome, which would only be published in 2013 (Yang et al.,
2013). This put researchers at a disadvantage in comparison to organ-
isms with more dedicated resources. Using Arabidopsis as comparator
was not a straightforward way to address this gap, since the very va-
lidity of the comparison would need to be assumed rather than de-
monstrated at the start of the research program. Nevertheless, re-
searchers decided to accept the risk, thus choosing to trust the potential
link to a powerful model organism in order to be able to work with an
economically valuable species.
6. Conclusion: unpacking ‘good’ organismal choice
As noted above, the criteria involved in choosing organisms for
biological research outlined here are not intended to be exhaustive.
What is more critical to our argument is the ways in which such criteria
are refined in concert (or conflict) with other criteria and placed in
synergy with others. Choosing organisms involves making strategic
choices about which of these criteria to emphasize. Through analysis of
cases, we have shown that such trade-offs tend to happen at the level of
specific research instances, making it impossible to provide a generic
table of the type generated by Levins in the case of model choice.
Nevertheless, this analysis of criteria for organismal choice and how
they relate to each other in practice does allow us to trace the devel-
opment of research trajectories and the role of organisms within them.
It also allows us to reflect more generally on what makes a particular
organism useful, or perhaps to what biologists sometimes refer in
shorthand as ‘good.’ At a minimum, it must be tractable and offer access
to the phenomenon that biologists wish to study. From an epistemo-
logical perspective, the organism must ‘match’ the entity that it seeks to
represent in ways that are relevant for the question(s) being addressed
(whether the entity is only organism's own species, a broader group or
taxon, or some other target group such as humans). The challenge is to
determine which aspects of biology need to match to consider the or-
ganism under study and that which is being represented to be ‘the same
kind’ with respect to the causes, qualities, or mechanisms involved in
the thing being studied. The less that we know about the phenomenon
to begin with, the more difficult this choice process is (Steel, 2008).
Articulating such requirements helps to clarify the factors on which
scientists should focus when they choose and assess organisms for
particular kinds of research. In addition, identifying misalignments or
potential choices that prove not to be useful (e.g., an organism that can
easily yield answers in terms of genetics is not particularly useful if one
wishes to study a disease that turns out to have critical environmental
causes) helps us to understand why organism-based research sometimes
fails to yield the expected or envisioned outcomes, particularly when
applying the results of basic research to humans for clinical purposes
(Von Herrath & Nepom, 2005; La Follette & Shanks, 2016).
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